Comparative report : citizenship in Asia by VONK, Olivier
AUTHORED BY
OLIVIER VONK
COMPARATIVE 
REPORT: 
CITIZENSHIP  
IN ASIA
COMPARATIVE 
REPORT
2017/04
DECEMBER 
2017
©	Olivier Vonk, 2017 
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the authors. If cited or 
quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the year and the 
publisher.  
Requests should be addressed to GlobalCit@eui.eu.  
Views expressed in this publication reflect the opinion of individual authors and not those of the 
European University Institute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT) 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
in collaboration with  
Edinburgh University Law School 
 
Comparative Report: Citizenship in Asia 
RSCAS/GLOBALCIT-Comp. 2017/4 
December 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Olivier Vonk, 2017 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
cadmus.eui.eu 
 
 
 
 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by 
Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major 
issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st 
century global politics. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, 
projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research 
agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing 
agenda of European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in 
Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world. 
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on: http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/  
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, and e-books. All of these are 
also available on the Schuman Centre’s website: http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/  
The European University Institute (EUI) and the Schuman Centre are not responsible for the opinions 
expressed by the author(s). 
 
 
 
 
GLOBALCIT 
 
GLOBALCIT is the successor of EUDO CITIZENSHIP, which has been the key reference for the 
study of citizenship and the franchise between 2009 and 2017. With the geographic expansion of the 
Observatory’s scope the new name reflects our worldwide coverage. 
GLOBALCIT provides the most comprehensive source of information on the acquisition and loss of 
citizenship in Europe for policy makers, NGOs and academic researchers. Its website hosts a number 
of databases on domestic and international legal norms, naturalisation statistics, citizenship and 
electoral rights indicators, a comprehensive bibliography and glossary, a forum with scholarly debates 
on current citizenship trends, media news on matters of citizenship policy and various other resources 
for research and policy-making. 
Research for the 2016/2017 GLOBALCIT Reports has been supported by the European University 
Institute’s Global Governance Programme, the EUI Research Council, and the British Academy 
Research Project CITMODES (co-directed by the EUI and the University of Edinburgh). 
The financial support from these projects is gratefully acknowledged. 
While our new website is under construction, for more information see: http://eudo-citizenship.eu  
RSCAS/GLOBALCIT-Comp. 2017/4- © 2017 Author(s)  1 
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Citizenship in Asia 
 
 
Olivier Vonk1 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This report analyses the contemporary citizenship laws of 22 countries in Asia, namely 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, East Timor (Timor-Leste), India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam.2 With the exception of 
Laos, Mongolia, North Korea and Thailand, the grounds for acquisition and loss of 
citizenship have been analysed in collaboration with a team of GLOBALCIT country 
experts.3 It was decided to exclude Bhutan, Brunei and Maldives, as no country experts have 
yet been identified and because all three have a particularly small population compared to the 
other states under examination.4   
The analysis relies not only on the country experts’ input regarding the modes of 
acquisition and loss of citizenship, but also on their respective country reports which will be 
referred to here as Aguilar 2017 (Philippines), Arraiza and Vonk 2017 (Myanmar), Ashesh 
and Thiruvengadam 2017 (India), Athayi 2017 (Afghanistan), Ganeshathasan and Welikala 
2017 (Sri Lanka), Harijanti 2017 (Indonesia), Hoque 2016 (Bangladesh), Jerónimo 2017 
(East Timor), Kondo 2016 (Japan), Lee 2017 (South Korea), Low 2016 (China/Taiwan),5 
Low 2017 (Malaysia/Singapore), Nazir 2016 (Pakistan), Nguyen 2017 (Vietnam), Shrestha 
2017 (Nepal) and Sperfeldt 2017 (Cambodia).6  
The first part of the report provides a background to the region by highlighting some 
pertinent issues surrounding citizenship law and by discussing the subject in relation to the 
                                                 
1 Marie Curie COFUND Fellow, University of Liège. 
2 The terms North and South Korea will be used instead of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
and the Republic of Korea (ROK), respectively. 
3 http://eudo-citizenship.eu/about/people/country-experts. See also the forthcoming GLOBALCIT Databases on 
Grounds for Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship, where many more details are provided compared to the 
overview tables in this report. 
4 The countries in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) will be 
covered in a separate GLOBALCIT comparative analysis by Medet Tiulegenov. Although countries such as 
Afghanistan and Mongolia are part of Central Asia according to some definitions, the major citizenship issues of 
the ‘Stans’ derive from the break-up of the Soviet Union and are therefore of a very different nature compared 
to the countries covered in this report. 
5 While the country report on China/Taiwan touches on Hong Kong, a British colony until 1997, more 
information on its nationality status can be found in White 1987, 1988, 1989. Similarly, the former Portuguese 
possession of Macau, returned to China in 1999, is discussed in the reports on China/Taiwan and East Timor. 
Other Portuguese possessions in Asia included Damão, Diu, Dadrá, Goa and Nagar Avelí. Together these 
territories formed Portuguese India and were referred to in Portuguese as ‘Antigo Estado da India’. 
6 Available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles. Full references are provided in the bibliography.  
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process of (de)colonisation. The second part presents a comparative overview of the main 
provisions of the citizenship laws of the selected countries. The analysis is structured along 
three major dimensions: acquisition of citizenship at birth, acquisition of citizenship after 
birth,7 and loss of citizenship. The third part discusses dual citizenship and statelessness as 
well as the discrepancies between law and practice. 
The Asian region is very vast and many of the sovereign states created in Asia after 
WWII were conspicuously multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-lingual (Suryadintata 
2015). The following quote may serve to set the scene: 
In the 1930s, large empires – British, Dutch, French, American, and Japanese – 
controlled Asia. By 1950, Asia was divided into nation-states. Between 1945 and 
1949, India, Pakistan, Burma [now Myanmar], Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines became independent. The Communist revolution in China created two 
states – the People’s Republic of China and a de facto nationalist state in Taiwan – as 
did the partition of Korea into North and South Korea: both divisions last to this day. 
The breakup of empires and the drawing of new borders produced countless refugees 
[…] It also produced a patchwork of minority populations within each new set of 
borders. Each new state faced the historical legacy of the mass immigration of an 
earlier era […], with the presence of large populations of what imperial administrators 
had once called ‘foreign Asians’: primarily people of Indian and Chinese origin 
(Amrith 2011: 117). 
Despite these historical events during the twentieth century, Asia is a continent that has 
notoriously been neglected in comparative nationality studies.8 Indeed, research on 
nationality law has traditionally suffered from what may be called an ‘Atlantic’ (Vink and 
Bauböck 2013: 640) or ‘Global North’ (Sadiq 2017: 165) bias,9 which is partly related to the 
fact that data on nationality laws of countries outside Europe and the Western world remain 
relatively scarce, although there has been a notable improvement in this respect by recent 
scholarship on the Americas and Africa.10 This lack of interest is to some extent 
understandable in that Asian countries have significantly lower accession rates to 
international treaties dealing with nationality law compared to other regions, and that no 
important citizenship-related judgments and decisions have been handed down by regional 
courts. By contrast, important judgments have been delivered by the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union;11 the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights;12  and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child.13  
                                                 
7 For the sake of convenience, acquisition iure soli after birth is discussed in the section on ius soli (section 
3.1.2). 
8 Monographs on the subject date back at least 27 years. See the publications by Hecker 1965, 1975 and 1978 
and Ko Swan Sik 1990. 
9 The lack of attention for Asia is also acknowledged by authors from the region itself. For example, it has been 
noted by Choe that since existing studies of citizenship mainly focus on European cases, his study of China and 
South Korea ‘will help expand scholarship on citizenship by evaluating both the achievements and the 
limitations of the [East Asian] area’ (Choe 2006: 84). 
10 See Vonk 2014, Manby 2015 as well as the different continent profiles at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-
profiles.  
11 ECHR, Genovese v. Malta, 11 October 2011; Case C-135/08, Rottmann [2010], 2 March 2010. 
12 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, 8 
September 2005. 
13 African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC). Decision on the 
communication submitted by the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa and the Open Society 
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2. Citizenship law in Asia: general aspects and the effects of 
(de)colonisation 
 
 
With the exception of Thailand,14 all countries under discussion have a history of being 
colonised or of colonising other countries themselves. The majority of them only became 
independent around the middle of the twentieth century and we can still witness the 
citizenship consequences of this relatively recent independence today. For example, 
The British colonial legacy is also visible in the current citizenship context in 
Malaysia. There are cases of Malaysian British Overseas Citizens (BOC) rendered 
stateless after failing to secure British nationality, having given up their Malaysian 
citizenship. As Malaysia strictly enforces a single nationality principle, any citizens 
exercising their right as a BOC and obtaining a British passport will lose their 
Malaysian citizenship (Low 2017: 2 and 30-31).  
Decolonisation not only had important consequences for the field of nationality law, but also 
for that of migration: 
Until the middle of the twentieth century, the common distinction between internal 
and international migration meant little in the Asian context. Most migration took 
place within and across the boundaries of empires. In the twentieth century, internal 
migration within empires turned abruptly into international migration, as new states 
were formed and new borders drawn (Amrith 2011: 3). 
The main European colonising powers were Britain, France, Portugal, the Netherlands and 
the United States. To start with French rule in Asia, Cambodia was a French protectorate 
between 1863-1953 and colonisation had a lasting impact in that Cambodia would henceforth 
adhere to the civil law system introduced by the French (Sperfeldt 2017: 2). In Vietnam, a 
French colony from the end of the nineteenth century until 1954, 
[g]enerally speaking, French laws, including the French Civil Code [were applied], 
following practices of the French courts in Cochinchine with local modifications.  
Most laws dealing with matters of citizenship were therefore concerned with 
naturalisation to French citizenship.  As Vietnam held the status of a colony under 
French rule – unlike those living in French Protectorates such as Laos and Cambodia 
– Vietnamese colonial inhabitants were treated as ‘subjects’ and generally enjoyed 
more rights and privileges, including access to French citizenship (Nguyen 2017: 4-
5). 
Indonesia declared itself independent from the Netherlands in 1945, after having been 
dominated by this European power for almost 350 years. East Timor had been a Portuguese 
colony for several centuries until it was, in turn, invaded by Indonesia in 1975.  The military 
occupation of East Timor lasted from 1975 until 1999 – during which time Indonesian 
citizenship law was applied (Harijanti 2017: 2) – and the country became an independent 
state in 2002. While the East Timor report notes that ‘the issue of whether the inhabitants of 
East Timor were Indonesian and/or Portuguese became highly topical in the early 1990s’ and 
addresses its legal intricacies in detail (Jerónimo 2017: 12), the Indonesian report pays less 
                                                                                                                                                       
Justice Initiative (on behalf of children of Nubian descent in Kenya) against the government of Kenya, 22 
March 2011. See extensively on these cases De Groot and Vonk 2016 and, more concisely, Vonk 2016. 
14 Schulte-Nordholt 2016: 190. This report does not touch on Papua New Guinea, previously a German colony 
and later part of Australia before acquiring independence in 1975. See Thwaites 2017: 11-13. 
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attention to the citizenship allocation treaty concluded in 1949 between Indonesia and the 
Netherlands, but instead focuses on Indonesian citizenship law after independence.15 
India had technically been a colony only from 1858-1947, although Ashesh and 
Thiruvengadam (4) point out that one could argue that the period of colonial rule in India 
extended to nearly two full centuries. Pakistan, also formerly part of British India, seceded 
from India in 1947 and at that time still included what is currently Bangladesh (Nazir 2016: 
10). The latter gained independence from Pakistan in 1971 (Hoque 2016: 1). These processes 
led to a massive displacement of people across borders on the Indian subcontinent. Burma, 
too, had been fully colonised by the British by 1885 and the laws enacted for British India 
were also applicable in what today constitutes Myanmar (Arraiza and Vonk 2017: 3). 
Sri Lanka was a British colony from 1796 until 1948. As Ganeshathasan and Welikala 
(1-3) show, its citizenship legislation ‘has been predominantly shaped by the issue of 
citizenship for the Up Country Tamil Community’. Of great importance is the struggle for Sri 
Lankan citizenship by this stateless group originating from parts of South India and recruited 
to work in the plantation sector during the British colonial period. 
While the Up Country Tamils take centre stage in the Sri Lankan report, other reports 
pay attention to the citizenship status of ethnic groups based in their respective countries, e.g. 
the Urdu-speaking minority/Non-Bengali Biharis in Bangladesh (Hoque 2016: 21-24); the 
ethnic-Vietnamese in Cambodia (Sperfeldt 2017: 17); and the Rohingya, an ethnic religious-
linguistic minority based primarily in Rakhine state in Myanmar, but who have spread over 
the entire South East Asian region as refugees. While the citizenship status of the Up Country 
Tamils and the Urdu-speaking minority has greatly improved,16 that of the Royingya has 
not.17 
Malaysia and Singapore had been British colonies until 1957 and briefly merged in 
1963. Singapore subsequently seceded from Malaysia in 1965 (Low 2017: 14). The very 
complex geographical and institutional structure of Malaysia and Singapore both before and 
after independence is explained in the Malaysian-Singapore report and summarised in a table 
at the end. The equally complex citizenship status of the population of Malaysia and 
Singapore when British nationality law still applied is also laid down in a separate table (Low 
2017: 33-35). 
The Philippines had been a Spanish colony before it was acquired, along with Puerto 
Rico and Guam, by the United States and its inhabitants thereby became US nationals 
(Aguilar 2017: 4-6; Spiro 2015: 3).18 As will be seen below in section 3.1.2., it was the 
Filipino elite’s prejudice against the ethnic Chinese which resulted in ius sanguinis taking 
over the role from ius soli as the basic principle for acquiring Philippine citizenship. 
Aguilar also refers to the US 1882 Chinese Exclusion Law, which was extended to the 
Philippines in 1898. Indeed, many reports pay attention to the role of Chinese migrants in 
their respective countries, e.g. by discussing the 1955 Indonesian-Sino dual nationality treaty 
                                                 
15 For a more detailed discussion of the allocation treaty, see Vonk 2012: 212-215, and in particular De Haas-
Engel 1993. 
16 ‘An outstanding development in the citizenship law of Bangladesh is the unambiguous judicial recognition of 
the citizenship-eligibility of the [Urdu-speaking minority] in Bangladesh’ (Hoque 2016: 28) and ‘The issue of 
statelessness among the Up Country Tamil community, created by the citizenship regime set up immediately 
after independence, has now been resolved legislatively’ (Ganeshathasan and Welikala 2017: 16). 
17 For recent updates on the position of the Rohingya, see numerous publications by the Institute on 
Statelessness and Inclusion at http://www.institutesi.org.   
18 For the relationship between Spain and the Philippines, in particular in light of dual citizenship, see Vonk 
2012: 281-324. 
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(Harijanti 2017: 7-9; Low 2016: 5-7) and discriminatory practices against individuals of 
Chinese descent (Aguilar 2017: 9; Jerónimo 2017: 2) It has also been argued that enacting a 
Chinese nationality law in the early twentieth century had become increasingly urgent for the 
Chinese government owing to the Dutch government’s rejection of the Chinese request to 
establish consulates in the Dutch East Indies because China lacked nationality legislation 
under which it could lay down a claim to diplomatic protection of its citizens (Ko Swan Sik 
1957: 122).19 
It is against this backdrop and in light of China’s weak position as explained below that 
China’s last dynasty enacted the first Chinese nationality act in 1909 (the ‘Qing Nationality 
Law’): 
In the nineteenth century, as the Qing dynasty became the sick man of East Asia, 
China lost much of its territory – the southern tributaries of Nepal and Burma to Great 
Britain; Indochina to France; Taiwan and the tributaries of Korea and Sakhalin to 
Japan; and Mongolia, Amuria, and Ussuria to Russia. In the twentieth century came 
the bloody Japanese takeovers of the Shandong Peninsula and Manchuria in the heart 
of China. This was all in addition to the humiliations forced on the Chinese by the 
extraterritoriality agreements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whereby 
Western nations wrested control of parts of Chinese cities – the so-called Treaty Ports 
(Kaplan 2014: 21).  
New Chinese nationality laws were enacted in 1912 and 1929, the latter law remaining in 
force until 1949. The People’s Republic of China would not have a nationality law during the 
‘silent period’ from 1949 until 1980, when the citizenship law currently in force was enacted. 
Particularly noteworthy in the Chinese context is the difference between rural and urban 
residents based on the household registration system (hukou). The segmented and 
differentiated allocations of citizens’ rights have allegedly resulted in rural migrants living in 
cities as second-class citizens (Low 2016: 15).  
Two issues attracting attention in Taiwan are the high proportion of naturalised 
females and the large proportion of marriage migrants. Foreign brides have accounted for 
88%-95% of total naturalisation between 2010 and 2015. As noted in the country report, 
The large share of marriage migrants in the total number of naturalisations can be 
explained for two reasons. First, the naturalisation numbers reflect the Taiwanese 
immigration trend of the feminisation of marriage migration. Second, labour migrants 
are excluded from the privilege of naturalisation. This is deeply embedded in the 
concept of ‘population quality’ in Taiwan’s migration and citizenship policy. Under 
the government’s categorisation of migrants, unskilled migrant workers are 
considered a lower-quality population. They are openly excluded from applying for 
permanent residence status or naturalisation (Low 2016: 24). 
In contrast to the countries discussed thus far, Japan is a former colonising power in 
Asia which acquired Taiwan in 1895 after the Sino-Japanese War and the southern part of 
Sakhalin20 in 1905 after the Russo-Japanese War (Kondo 2016: 3). Moreover, Japan’s 
colonial ambitions were partly grounded in a ‘scientific’ racist discourse. In this respect, 
                                                 
19 The same argument was to be repeated later in a chapter on Indonesia in a monograph on nationality law in 
Asia: ‘The first modern Chinese law on nationality of 1909 was enacted by way of response to the Dutch 
argument that China had no legitimate claim to [jurisdiction over Chinese immigrants in the Dutch East Indies 
and their descendants] as it had not even a nationality law to which to refer’ (Ko Swan Sik 1990: 164). 
20 Note that Sakhalin is also referred to in the Korean country report in connection with the forcible transfer of 
Koreans to the island by Japan. They were subsequently treated as stateless by the Soviet authorities after 
WWII. See Lee 2017: 24-25. 
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Imperial Japan was similar to both Europe and the Americas, where policies based on alleged 
biological differences also featured prominently at the time.21  
 As a result, Japan has had to deal with the citizenship position of its former colonial subjects: 
Despite assertions that immigration is a new phenomenon in Japan, Japanese 
politicians and pundits have been debating the problem of immigrant incorporation 
since at least the Meiji period … when Japan’s first [1899] citizenship law was 
instituted. Moreover, as was the case with former European colonial powers, Japanese 
state officials formulated citizenship criteria in the context of decolonization and 
reconstruction in the postwar period. Consequently, debates on nationality and 
citizenship policies were concerned not only with redefining Japanese national 
identity as a democratic nation-state but also with the legal position of Japan’s former 
colonial subjects (Chung 2010: 19). 
This quote draws our attention to the position of former colonial subjects and their 
descendants under Japanese law. A particular feature of the Japanese case is that ‘large 
numbers of imperial subjects from neighboring territories migrated to the Japanese metropole 
up until the end of World War II’ (Chung 2010: 62). The unsuccessful mass repatriation of 
this undesirable population after the end of the war, which was partly due to the outbreak of 
the Korean War in 1950,22 would ultimately lead to Japan unilaterally stripping its former 
colonial subjects of their Japanese nationality – a case of arbitrary deprivation of nationality 
based on grounds of ethnic origin, according to the country report (Kondo 2016: 11-12; see 
also Lee 2017: 10-11). The Korean report addresses in detail the citizenship-related 
problems surrounding the division of North and South Korea, in particular given that both 
countries consider themselves the legitimate sovereigns of the entire Korean peninsula. Thus,  
Korea’s division into the Republic of Korea (South Korea [or] ROK) and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea [or] DPRK) gives rise to the 
question of how to treat the citizens of the DPRK, given only the very abstract 
constitutional rule that the ROK has sovereignty over the whole of the Korean 
peninsula and adjacent islands (Lee 2017: 2). 
Close to nothing is known about citizenship law in North Korea – a brutal dictatorship 
engaging in some of the worst human rights violations the world has known (Kirby and 
Gopalan 2015: 232) – and the GLOBALCIT analysis of North Korean law is based on the 
translation of a citizenship act containing only 15 Articles. The few publications on North 
Korean citizenship law mainly deal with the subject from the perspective of North Korean 
asylum seekers (Wolman 2012). 
The reports on Afghanistan and Nepal both point to the lack of available data on 
matters relating to citizenship. Moreover, both countries face difficulties that do not exist, or 
exist to a much lesser extent, in the other Asian countries studied in this report. While 
‘Afghanistan does not have a well-structured system of registration of births among its 
population’ (Athayi 2017: 9), in Nepal a significant part of the population lacks citizenship 
certificates, leading to the following day-to-day problems: 
Without citizenship certificates, people are unable to enjoy fundamental rights in 
Nepal. Possession of these certificates is required for civil documentation and 
                                                 
21 See for example the influential racist and anti-semitic ideas of Georges Mauco in the French context in Vonk 
2012: 176, 182. On ideologies like eugenics that favoured selectivity in the field of citizenship and migration in 
the Americas, see FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014. 
22 While the great majority of former colonial subjects from China and Taiwan would leave Japan, the Korean 
population had less incentives to leave because of the war.  
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financial services. Moreover, they are required to access land and house titles, credit 
and bank accounts, and to be able to exercise basic civil and political rights (Shrestha 
2017: 17). 
The problems of birth registration and lack of citizenship certificates and/or identity 
documents also feature prominently in Cambodia (Sperfeldt 2017: 15-16) and Myanmar 
(Vonk 2017).23 
In discussions of Asian migration, it has been noted that ‘many of the laws and 
techniques to control migration originated in the United States, Australia, Canada, and South 
Africa, and many of these measures arose from the desire to exclude Asian migrants’ (Amrith 
2011: 13). Asian migrants were indeed frequently considered undesirable aliens and were for 
a long time subject to numerical limits on immigration (or barred from immigration 
altogether),24 and suffered discriminatory treatment with regard to access to nationality in 
their country of residence. The following brief remarks on the position of Asians wishing to 
migrate to or naturalise in western countries during the twentieth century may therefore be in 
order.  
Both Australia and the United States for a long time had policies that discouraged or banned 
Asians from naturalising. As for Australia, 
In contrast with the 1903 [Naturalisation] Act, the 1920 [Naturalisation] Act did not 
expressly deny persons the ability to apply for naturalisation on grounds of race. In its 
place it conferred ‘absolute discretion’ on the Governor-General to give or withhold a 
naturalisation certificate without providing a reason, giving the government scope to 
apply any policy on naturalisation of non-Europeans it thought fit. Only 45 persons 
characterized by the government as being of an Asian nationality were naturalised 
between 1904 and 1953 (Thwaites 2017: 6). 
Changes to this established policy took place in 1957 and 1966 and would result in Australia 
formally abolishing this discriminatory treatment from 1972 onwards (ibid: 11). 
The situation was not much different in the United States. While the question of ius 
soli was settled with the Supreme Court’s decision in Wong Kim Ark (1898),25 racial 
discrimination was to prevail in both immigration and citizenship law until the mid-twentieth 
century. It was not until 1952 that racial naturalisation bars were removed, and not until 1965 
that the national origins system was abolished in US immigration law (Motomura 2006: 
171).26 
It has recently been argued that Latin America played a key role in removing racial 
discrimination from citizenship and migration law: 
                                                 
23 See also the work of the Norwegian Refugee Council with regard to facilitating the issuing of identity cards 
since 2012 through mobile One Stop Service (OSS) centers in South East Myanmar: 
https://www.nrc.no/news/2016/july/providing-legal-aid-to-vulnerable-communities/.  
24 ‘After [the U.S.] Congress legislated Chinese exclusion in 1882, Japanese and other Asians immigrated to 
replace Chinese labor but became new targets of exclusion. A diplomatic agreement between the United States 
and Japan in 1908 curbed Japanese immigration and the Immigration Act of 1917 excluded Asian Indians and 
all other native inhabitants of a “barred Asiatic zone” that ran from Afghanistan to the Pacific’ (Ngai 2004: 18). 
25 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).  
26 Note however that, confusingly, some local American courts would naturalise Asians (e.g. Chinese or 
Indians) anyway. From 1906 onwards this practice would trigger a counter-reaction from the Naturalization 
Bureau in that it began, with the support of the Supreme Court, to actively denaturalise Asians – and in some 
cases render them stateless. See Weil 2013: 76-82. 
Also observe that the US naturalisation law of 1870 had not explicitly excluded persons of Chinese descent 
from naturalisation. Since this would only be done by means of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, several 
Chinese were successful in applying for naturalisation in the US. See Salyer 2005: 57. 
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A widespread narrative attributes the demise of ethnic discrimination in immigration 
laws to the vertical scale of politics within each Anglophone settler state. An extended 
analysis of the horizontal plane shows that this narrative is partial and inaccurate. 
Motivated by a search for respect after centuries of racial stigmatization, Asian and 
African leaders allied with the ‘Latin American bloc’ to challenge the dominance of 
the great powers of the West and to pressure for anti-racist principles that would 
ultimately change immigration policies throughout the Western Hemisphere and the 
Anglophone settler societies (FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014: 80).27 
Still, one should not lose out of sight the fact that during certain periods intra-Asian 
migration was numerically much more important: ‘Whereas 40 per cent of Chinese emigrants 
in the 1850s travelled beyond Asia, between the 1880s and 1930, 96 per cent of Chinese 
emigrants remained within Asia’ (emphasis in orginal; Amrith 2011: 38). 
 
 
3. Comparative Analysis of citizenship laws 
 
3.1. Acquisition of citizenship by birth 
 
Although international treaties aim to harmonise the rules concerning the acquisition of 
nationality, there remains a huge variety of grounds for acquisition by operation of law. The 
most frequent ways of acquisition of nationality by birth are acquisition iure sanguinis (by 
birth as a child of a national) and acquisition iure soli (by birth on the territory of a state). 
Originally, all states which provided for an acquisition of nationality iure sanguinis 
almost exclusively applied ius sanguinis a patre (by the paternal line); only in exceptional 
circumstances was ius sanguinis a matre (by the maternal line) relevant (e.g. in the case of a 
child born out of wedlock and not recognised by a man). In practice, however, most children 
had the same nationality as the father and mother, because women lost their own nationality 
at the moment of marriage and at that moment acquired the nationality of their husband. 
During the twentieth century this ‘unitary’ system was gradually replaced by the ‘dualist’ 
system which allowed women to possess their own independent nationality. The Asian 
countries were no exception and several of the country reports refer to the year gender 
equality was introduced:  Bangladesh (2008), China (1980), India (1992), Japan (1985), 
Nepal (2006), Pakistan (2000), South Korea (1998), Sri Lanka (2003) and Taiwan (2000 but 
with retroactive effect to 1980).  
Rather uniquely, however, some countries such as Indonesia and Japan do not accept 
dual citizenship arising from mixed marriages. In Japan, the obligation to choose between the 
foreign and Japanese citizenships applies irrespective of whether the foreign nationality was 
acquired iure sanguinis or iure soli, although the policy does not seem to be strictly enforced 
(Kondo 2016: 6). The situation in Indonesia is as follows: 
                                                 
27 ‘Governments and non-state actors from geopolitically weaker countries like Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and 
Panama played a leadership role in delegitimizing racism and eventually pressuring stronger countries like the 
United States and Canada to change their immigration policies. These developments run counter to the received 
wisdom that the international turn away from racial discrimination in public policies was led by liberal 
democratic exemplars of the hemisphere in response to domestic politics and happened after World War II in 
reaction to Nazi atrocities and scientific racism’ (FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014: 47). 
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Children born from an international marriage have dual citizenship. They have to opt 
for one of the nationalities when they reach the age of 18 years and before the age of 
21 years at the latest. Unfortunately, the 2006 [Citizenship] Law does not regulate in 
detail their status if they fail to do so. Rather, the consequence of this failure is found 
in Government Regulation No. 2 of 2007, which says that ‘in the case of children […] 
who do not choose any of their citizenships, the legislative provisions on foreigners 
shall apply’ (Harijanti 2017: 13). 
Thus, the concerned children will lose their Indonesian nationality if they are affected by this 
condition (ibid: 13). 
Nowadays, most countries apply a combination of ius sanguinis and ius soli principles. 
Classical ius soli countries provide, in the case of birth abroad of a child of a national, for an 
acquisition iure sanguinis, but often limit the transmission of nationality in this way to the 
first or second generation. In cases where countries have decided to apply additional 
conditions to transmission iure soli, they have given more weight to acquisition iure 
sanguinis by adding provisions for automatic acquisition by descent for those children born 
inside the country of a parent who is a national. 
On the other hand, classical ius sanguinis countries have in the recent past introduced 
some elements of ius soli in order to reduce cases of statelessness or to stimulate the 
integration of the descendants of foreign families residing permanently on their territory. 
 
3.1.1. Ius sanguinis 
It is apparent from a glance at tables 1 and 2 that the primary mode of acquiring citizenship 
by birth in the Asian countries is by ius sanguinis. In this sense, the Asian states follow the 
European rather than the American practice (Vonk 2014; Dumbrava 2017). Particularly 
noteworthy in the Asian context is the position of children born outside the country; 
additional conditions are required for children to acquire their parents’ citizenship and 
widespread resistance exists to these children becoming dual citizens. In this respect, the 
Asian practice is clearly more restrictive than that in Europe. Gender-discriminatory rules 
still exist in Nepal (irrespective of whether the child is born in Nepal or abroad, see Mulmi 
and Shneiderman 2017) and Malaysia (in case the child is born abroad). 
 
 
Table 1 – Rules of ius sanguinis 
 Child born in the country Child born outside the country 
General rule Special cases General rule Special cases 
Afghanistan Automatic - Automatic Main rule: both parents 
need to be citizens 
Bangladesh Automatic - Automatic / 
Registration 
Depending on whether 
parent is a citizen by 
descent or other than 
descent 
Cambodia Automatic Birth needs to 
be in wedlock 
Automatic Birth needs to be in 
wedlock 
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China Automatic - Automatic NO if parent is settled 
abroad and child can 
acquire another 
citizenship 
East Timor Automatic - Declaration - 
India Automatic - Automatic / 
Registration 
Depending on whether 
parent is a citizen by 
descent or other than 
descent 
Indonesia Automatic Birth needs to 
be in wedlock 
Automatic Birth needs to be in 
wedlock and restriction 
on dual citizenship 
Japan Automatic - Automatic Restriction on dual 
citizenship 
Laos Automatic - Automatic Main rule: both parents 
need to be citizens 
Malaysia Automatic - Automatic / 
Registration 
Depending on whether 
the father or mother is 
a citizen 
Mongolia Automatic - Automatic Main rule: both parents 
need to be citizens 
Myanmar Automatic One parent 
must be a 
citizen and 
other parent a 
citizen, 
associate 
citizen or 
‘naturalised’ 
citizen 
Automatic One parent must be a 
citizen and other parent 
a citizen, associate 
citizen or ‘naturalised’ 
citizen 
Nepal Declaration /  
Naturalisation 
Children born 
to Nepalese 
mother and 
non-citizen 
father may 
apply for 
naturalisation 
Declaration / 
Naturalisation 
Children born to 
Nepalese mother and 
non-citizen father may 
apply for naturalisation 
North Korea Automatic - Automatic Restriction on dual 
citizenship 
Pakistan Automatic - Automatic / 
Registration 
Depending on whether 
parent is a citizen by 
descent or other than 
descent  
Philippines Automatic - Automatic - 
Singapore Automatic - Registration Restriction on dual 
citizenship; parent who 
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is a citizen by descent 
needs to have had prior 
residence in Singapore 
South Korea Automatic - Automatic - 
Sri Lanka Automatic - Registration 
(entitlement or 
discretionary) 
Depending on whether 
child is registered 
within one year after 
birth  
Taiwan Automatic - Automatic - 
Thailand Automatic - Automatic - 
Vietnam Automatic Main rule: both 
parents need to 
be citizens 
Automatic Main rule: both parents 
need to be citizens 
 
3.1.2. Ius soli 
Table 2 describes the situation of foreigners born in the country. The GLOBALCIT 
Observatory makes a distinction between acquisition at birth – either for the first or second 
generation born in the country – and between acquisition after birth.     
 A clear global trend is the abolition of automatic ius soli or its replacement by more 
conditional forms of ius soli (in Africa in particular in the Commonwealth states, Manby 
2015: 2). The Americas remain the notable exception, with 30 out of 35 countries providing 
for automatic and unconditional ius soli (Vonk 2014). A shift from ius soli to ius sanguinis 
has been witnessed in Asia in the course of the twentieth century. Thus, according to the 
Indian report, 
The framers of India’s constitution adopted a modernist, secular notion of citizenship 
by seeking to incorporate a broadly ius soli conception of citizenship in the 
Constitution. Over time, this has been modified to incorporate various elements of a 
ius sanguinis model of citizenship, with the insertion of notions of descent, common 
religious identity and common ‘national’ values into the discourse of citizenship 
(Ashesh and Thiruvengadam 2017: 20). 
A similar trend can be witnessed in other Asian countries: ‘Since the Bangladeshi citizenship 
of the parent(s) of a child born in Bangladesh is a primary reason for his or her becoming a 
citizen by birth, it can be safely argued that […] the Bangladesh citizenship principle has de 
facto shifted from ius soli to ius sanguinis’ (Hoque 2016: 13). 
As for Indonesia, ‘In 1946, the Indonesian government promulgated the first 
Indonesian citizenship law, known as Law No. 3 of 1946 concerning Citizenship and 
Resident of Indonesia which emphasised the use of ius soli […] This principal basis was then 
changed to ius sanguinis by Law No. 62 of 1958’ (Harijanti 2017: 2). 
The situation in Malaysia is slightly more complex: 
[B]irthright citizenship [introduced after independence] was replaced with double ius 
soli under a new constitutional arrangement called the Federation of Malaya, which 
came into force on 1 February 1948.  Based on the concept of double ius soli, second 
generation migrants obtained federal citizenship automatically if both of their parents 
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were born and had resided in the Federation for a continuous period of at least fifteen 
years […] The next development in Malayan citizenship provisions was in September 
1952. In a constitutional amendment in 1952, the double ius soli principle was 
replaced with delayed ius soli. Under the principle of delayed ius soli, local-born 
children became subjects of a Malay ruler if one of their parents was born in the 
Federation of Malaya […] (emphasis added; Low 2017: 5-6). 
Ius sanguinis would come to prevail over ius soli, however, starting from 1962: ‘According 
to the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1962, birth in the Federation entitled one to Federal 
citizenship if one of the parents was either a citizen or a permanent resident in the Federation. 
Ius soli was no longer applied without condition and it was conditioned by elements of ius 
sanguinis’ (Low 2017: 16). 
The Philippines had applied ius soli under the short-lived Malolos Constitution (1899-
1901) and during the period under US colonial rule, but favoured ius sanguinis after 
independence – the watershed occurring in 1947 when the Supreme Court abandoned ius soli 
once and for all (Aguilar 2017: 11). The Philippines now provides for a slightly facilitated 
naturalisation procedure for persons born on the territory (ibid: 12). The rationale for 
favouring ius sanguinis over ius soli is worth quoting at length: 
One major reason for the adoption of ius sanguinis in the 1935 Constitution and in 
postwar jurisprudence was the Filipino elite’s prejudice against the ethnic Chinese, 
generations of whom had migrated from southern China to the Philippines over the 
course of several centuries. In the postcolonial period, Chinese who were born on 
Philippine territory, as well as those who migrated to the country, could acquire 
Philippine citizenship only through a costly judicial procedure of naturalisation. 
Chinese who could not afford the costs of naturalisation carried Taiwanese passports 
[…] For several decades Chinese leaders campaigned for acceptance and inclusion in 
the Philippine body politic. Proposals for modified forms of ius soli were made but 
never prospered. In 1975, however, Ferdinand Marcos utilised the historical 
conjuncture to grant mass naturalisation to ethnic Chinese and other resident aliens, 
mostly South Asians, as part of establishing diplomatic relations with the People’s 
Republic of China […] Administrative naturalisation is now an established procedure, 
serving as the means by which aliens and a handful of stateless persons born on 
Philippine territory gain citizenship (Aguilar 2017: 1-2). 
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Table 2 – Rules of ius soli 
 Birth in country (2nd 
generation) 
Birth in country (3rd generation) Birth in country (acquisition after birth) 
General 
rule 
Special cases General rule Special cases General rule Special cases 
Afghanistan N/A - N/A - Declaration After the age of 18 
Bangladesh - NO in practice 
(although law 
provides for 
automatic ius soli) 
N/A - N/A - 
Cambodia N/A - Automatic Both parents 
were born in 
Cambodia and 
are legally 
resident 
Naturalisation After 3 years’ residence; 
other conditions apply 
China N/A - N/A - N/A - 
East Timor N/A - Automatic - Declaration After the age of 17 
India N/A - N/A - - - 
Indonesia N/A - N/A - N/A - 
Japan N/A - Naturalisation Waiver of certain 
requirements 
Naturalisation After 3 years’ residence; 
other conditions apply 
Laos N/A - N/A - N/A - 
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 Malaysia Automatic Parent is 
permanently 
resident foreigner 
N/A - N/A - 
Mongolia N/A - N/A - N/A - 
Myanmar N/A - N/A - N/A - 
Nepal N/A - N/A - N/A - 
North Korea N/A - N/A - N/A - 
Pakistan ? - N/A -  N/A - 
Philippines N/A - N/A - Naturalisation After the age of 18 and 
based on continuous 
residence since birth; 
other conditions apply 
Singapore N/A - N/A - N/A - 
South Korea N/A - Naturalisation Waiver of certain 
requirements 
N/A - 
Sri Lanka N/A - N/A - N/A - 
Taiwan Automatic - Naturalisation Waiver of certain 
requirements 
Naturalisation After 3 years’ residence; 
other conditions apply 
Thailand Automatic Unless parent is 
temporarily 
resident or entered 
illegally 
N/A - N/A - 
Vietnam N/A - N/A - N/A - 
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3.1.3. Special rules of acquisition of citizenship at birth 
Not all Asian countries grant automatic access to citizenship to children who are found or 
abandoned on their territory, although it may be assumed that most countries will nonetheless 
presume such children to be citizens (e.g. Hoque 2016: 17). Those that do grant citizenship 
sometimes maintain limitations with regard to the age of the child, in particular by providing 
that only newborn children are eligible. The question whether foundlings with no known 
parentage became natural-born citizens became a key issue in the Philippines in the context 
of the 2016 national elections (Aguilar 2017: 19-21). 
The best solution to the problem of statelessness is evidently to secure for everyone 
the acquisition of a nationality at birth. For this reason several international instruments 
impose explicit obligations upon states to grant citizenship to children born on their territory 
who would otherwise be stateless. The most important international instrument in this respect 
is the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, yet none of the Asian states under 
discussion is a party to this convention.28 Some countries consider the convention to be 
incompatible with their citizenship law (Kondo 2016: 10). 
A number of country reports explicitly point to the legislative gap in respect of 
foundlings and stateless children (Hoque 2016: 17-18). 
 
Table 3 – Special rules of acquisition of citizenship at birth 
 Stateless at birth Foundlings 
Afghanistan Automatic - 
Bangladesh - - 
Cambodia - Automatic 
China Automatic - 
East Timor Automatic  Automatic 
India - - 
Indonesia Automatic Automatic (only newborns) 
Japan Automatic / Naturalisation (depending on 
citizenship of parents) 
Automatic 
Laos Declaration (if parents are permanent 
residents) 
Automatic 
Malaysia Automatic - 
Mongolia Registration (if parents are permanent 
residents) 
Automatic 
Myanmar - - 
Nepal - Automatic 
North Korea Automatic Automatic 
Pakistan - - 
                                                 
28 This is not the place to discuss other instruments dealing with statelessness, such as the 1989 Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. See Vonk, Vink and De Groot 2013: 38-42. 
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Philippines - - 
Singapore Registration Automatic (only newborns) 
South Korea Automatic Automatic 
Sri Lanka - Automatic (only newborns) 
Taiwan Automatic Automatic 
Thailand - - 
Vietnam Automatic (if parents are permanent 
residents) 
Automatic (only newborns) 
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3.2. Acquisition of citizenship after birth 
3.2.1. Ordinary naturalisation and special naturalisation for spouses of citizens 
One of the characteristics of non-Western countries in the field of citizenship law is the 
modest role of ordinary naturalisation as a means to acquire nationality.29 In Bangladesh, for 
example only 418 persons naturalised in the period 1988-2016, of whom 416 on the basis of a 
family relationship (Hoque 2016: 15). The naturalisation rate in Japan, at 0.4 percent of the 
foreign population in 2013, is extremely low among OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) countries, which Kondo mainly attributes to Japan’s rejection of 
dual citizenship (Kondo 2016: 1, 7). In Malaysia, the road to naturalisation is fraught with 
obstacles: 
The greatest barriers to naturalisation include the lack of clear guidelines, a lack of 
transparency, no reason given for rejection, no time limits set for the evaluation of 
applications, and no rules on appeal procedures. Citizenship by registration and 
naturalisation is highly discretionary. Immigrant spouses are subject to the 
discretionary naturalisation regime, even when fulfilling the application criteria. 
There were 32,927 citizenship applications filed by both locals and foreigners 
between 1997 and 2009. The application process does not have a clear timeframe, 
which resulted in many applicants waiting for a response for two decades. According 
to the Home Minister, the approval of a citizenship application is very subjective. The 
main reasons behind citizenship applications being rejected include patriotism, state 
security and financial considerations. Between 2000 and 2009, 4,029 foreigners 
applied for citizenship; 1,806 applications were approved. In the same timeframe, 
3,640 applications for citizenship involved children and 1,066 applications were 
approved. The Home Ministry reiterated that Malaysian citizenship is a privilege and 
not a right (Low 2017: 18-19). 
The South Korean case is a good illustration of the interaction between different modes of 
acquisition, namely automatic acquisition, facilitated naturalisation for spouses, and re-
acquisition of citizenship by former citizens. While the frequency of naturalisation in the 
1990s was very low in Korea, this was because  
the foreign spouses of Korean men did not need naturalisation until early 1998 
because they automatically acquired citizenship upon marriage. In that period, ethnic 
return migration from the former communist countries was restricted. Return migrants 
from China had greater recourse to reinstatement of nationality than naturalisation 
because the first-generation Korean Chinese were treated as having once held ROK 
citizenship. Since 2001, naturalisation cases have increasingly outnumbered cases of 
reinstatement of nationality (Lee 2017: 27). 
In practice, this meant that naturalisation numbers which did not exceed a hundred per year 
until the mid-1990s have increased to over 10,000 per year in the last decade. As for North 
Korea, the provision dealing with naturalisation only stipulates that the applicant is a 
foreigner. The provision is therefore hard to interpret, but will in any case have little effect 
given the low demand for North Korean citizenship.  
In respect of Pakistan, Sadiq has pointed at the discrepancy between the country’s 
narrow Islamic national identity, while on paper displaying a citizenship policy that seems 
open and based on inclusive principles. ‘This discrepancy is one of appearance only’, Sadiq 
                                                 
29 While this has somewhat changed since the late 1990s, ‘fewer than 10 foreigners were naturalized every year 
in Korea from 1948 to 1985’. Choe 2006: 102, 105. 
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notes. ‘In Pakistan, there is a disconnection between formal citizenship laws and the reality of 
citizenship practice, in which the discriminatory treatment of women and ethnic minorities is 
rampant’ (Sadiq 2009: 4). Indeed, the policy effectively separates Muslims from non-
Muslims and ‘while formal gender restrictions in citizenship laws were liberalized by 2000, 
other judicial practices and norms continue to devalue female citizenship in Pakistan’ (ibid: 
13). The country’s ‘Islam-based exclusionary conception of Pakistani nationality’ means that 
‘Islamic principles increasingly defined every aspect of life in Pakistan, therefore 
discouraging any non-Muslim claimants to Pakistani citizenship’ (ibid: 13, 17). The result is 
that ‘gaining access to … Pakistani citizenship through naturalization is a rare occurrence’ 
(ibid: 16). 
According to Ganeshathasan and Welikala (14, 16), ‘Sri Lanka does not encourage 
naturalisation of foreign citizens’ and ‘naturalisation of foreign nationals is allowed in only 
very limited situations where such persons have a link to Sri Lanka either through their 
parents or spouse or in situations where such persons have made a significant contribution to 
the country’. 
In conclusion, naturalisation patterns in Asia clearly resemble more closely those in 
Latin America30 and Africa31 than those in Europe.  
                                                 
30 Acosta 2016: 7-8. Various GLOBALCIT country reports (e.g. Nicaragua and Peru) observe that naturalisation 
rates in Latin America are very low. 
31 According to Manby (198), ‘It is indicative of the difficulty of naturalisation that there are almost no 
published statistics about the numbers naturalised in most African countries. Those statistics that are available 
reveal that the numbers of naturalised persons vary hugely across countries, but are generally low’. 
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Table 4 – Rules of ordinary naturalisation 
 Residence 
(years) 
 
Renunciation 
of other 
citizenship 
Language Knowledge 
about the 
country 
 
Good 
character 
Self-
sufficiency 
Clean 
criminal 
record 
Oath of 
allegiance 
Afghanistan 5 - - - - - Yes - 
Bangladesh 5 Yes  - - Yes - - Yes 
Cambodia 7 - Yes Yes Yes - Yes - 
China - Yes - - - - Yes Yes (in the sense 
of respect for 
Constitution) 
East Timor 10 - Yes Yes - Yes - - 
India 12 Yes Yes - Yes - - Yes 
Indonesia 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Japan 5 Yes - - Yes Yes - Yes (in the sense 
of respect for 
Constitution) 
Laos 10 Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes (in the sense 
of respect for 
Constitution) 
Malaysia 11 - Yes - Yes - - Yes 
Mongolia 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - 
Myanmar N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Nepal N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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North Korea - - - - - - - - 
Pakistan 5 Yes Yes - Yes Yes - Yes 
Philippines 10 - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes (in 
the sense 
of 
irreproach
able 
conduct) 
Yes (in the sense 
of respect for 
Philippine 
customs) 
Singapore 11 Yes Yes - Yes - - Yes 
South Korea 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - - 
Sri Lanka N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Taiwan 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - 
Thailand 5 - Yes - Yes Yes   
Vietnam 5 Yes Yes - - Yes - Yes (in the sense 
of respect for 
Constitution and 
customs) 
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Table 5 – Special naturalisation - spouses of citizens 
*female spouse of male citizen only **male spouse of female citizen only 
 
 
Procedure Residence 
(Years) 
Renunciation 
of other 
citizenship 
Language Other 
conditions 
Afghanistan Discretionary - - - Yes  
Bangladesh Discretionary 2 Yes - Yes 
Cambodia Discretionary 3 - - - 
China N/A - - - - 
East Timor Entitlement 2 - Yes Yes 
India Discretionary 7 - - Yes 
Indonesia Declaration 5 Yes - - 
Japan Discretionary 3 Yes - Yes 
Laos N/A - - - - 
Malaysia Discretionary* 2 - - Yes 
Mongolia N/A - - - - 
Myanmar N/A - - - - 
Nepal Entitlement* - Yes - - 
North Korea N/A - - - - 
Pakistan Entitlement* - - - Yes 
Philippines Discretionary** 5 - Yes Yes 
Singapore Discretionary* 2 Yes - Yes 
South Korea Discretionary 2 - Yes Yes 
Sri Lanka Discretionary 1 Yes - Yes 
Taiwan Discretionary 3 Yes Yes Yes 
Thailand Discretionary* 
Discretionary** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Yes 
Vietnam Discretionary - Yes - Yes 
 
As for special naturalisation based on special achievements or contributions to the country 
(table 6), it is sometimes unclear if any of the ordinary naturalisation conditions apply. If this 
is not explicitly stipulated in the law, the analysis reads ‘no other conditions’. 
Most noteworthy is that this provision in Nepal seems to replace ordinary 
naturalisation, which does not exist in the country. Thus, Nepalese citizenship can be 
acquired under this ground for acquisition either as a form of honorary citizenship, with no 
other requirements that have to be met, or as a result of 15 years of residence in combination 
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with special merits in fields such as science or art. In the latter case, conditions have to be 
met which in other countries are standard requirements for naturalisation, such as language 
skills and the renunciation of citizenship of another country.  
 
Table 6 – Special naturalisation - persons with special achievements or contributions 
Grounds Main facilitations 
Afghanistan N/A - 
Bangladesh N/A - 
Cambodia Special merits or achievements No other conditions 
China N/A - 
East Timor High and relevant services No other conditions 
India N/A - 
Indonesia Has enhanced the status of 
Indonesia or grant of citizenship 
is in country’s interest 
All naturalisation conditions except 
renunciation of other citizenship are 
waived 
Japan Special meritorious services No residence requirement 
Laos N/A - 
Malaysia N/A - 
Mongolia Has done an honour for the 
country or profession or 
experience is in the interest of 
Mongolia 
Conditions relating to residence, 
means for self-support and knowledge 
of language and customs can be 
waived 
Myanmar N/A - 
Nepal Special merits - 
North Korea N/A - 
Pakistan N/A - 
Philippines N/A - 
Singapore N/A - 
South Korea Contributed greatly to South 
Korea or has special abilities in 
e.g. science or culture 
Conditions relating to residence, age, 
renunciation requirement and means of 
living can be waived 
Sri Lanka Contributed to social and 
cultural life 
All conditions can be waived, but 
person must have intent to ordinarily 
reside in the country 
Taiwan Special contribution  All conditions can be waived 
Thailand N/A - 
Vietnam Meritorious contribution to 
national construction and 
defence 
Conditions relating to residence, 
language and means of living can be 
waived 
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3.3. Loss of citizenship 
 
There is an enormous variety of grounds for loss of nationality, either ex lege on the initiative 
of the state or on the initiative of the individual involved. The 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness forbids some grounds for loss of nationality if this would cause 
statelessness for the person involved, but the convention also provides for several exceptions 
to this rule. Articles 7 and 8 of the European Convention on Nationality go further and give 
an exhaustive list of acceptable grounds for loss of nationality, some of which are addressed 
below (De Groot and Vonk 2016: 64 and, for an analysis from the perspective of 
statelessness, Vonk, Vink and De Groot 2013). 
 
3.3.1 Voluntary loss of citizenship 
In some countries renunciation of citizenship is explicitly withheld in times of war (Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, and Sri Lanka). Several countries still have 
compulsory military service, such as Singapore (Low 2017: 26) and South Korea (Lee 2017: 
35), and make release from citizenship dependent on fulfilment of this obligation. 
Mongolia and Vietnam have a protection mechanism by providing for (facilitated) 
reacquisition of citizenship when the acquisition of another citizenship does not materialise. 
Taiwan, by contrast, allows for the possibility to revoke the renunciation in case no other 
citizenship is acquired. Nepal and North Korea have no provision on voluntary renunciation, 
while Thailand only allows renunciation for certain categories of citizens, for example those 
who can acquire the citizenship of a foreign spouse. 
 
Table 7 – Voluntary loss of citizenship – conditions 
* Renunciation is not possible 
Country Possession 
of another 
citizenship 
Residence 
abroad 
No ongoing 
charges or 
convictions 
Completed 
military (or 
alternative) 
service 
No other 
obligations 
towards the 
state/ others 
Afghanistan  - - Yes - Yes 
Bangladesh - - - - - 
Cambodia Yes - - - - 
China - Yes - Yes - 
East Timor Yes - - - - 
India - - - - - 
Indonesia Yes Yes - - - 
Japan Yes - - - - 
Laos - - Yes - Yes 
Malaysia Yes - - - - 
Mongolia Yes - Yes - Yes 
Myanmar - - - - - 
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Nepal* - - - - - 
North 
Korea* 
- - - - - 
Pakistan Yes - - - - 
Philippines - - - - - 
Singapore Yes - - Yes - 
South Korea Yes Yes - Yes - 
Sri Lanka - - - - - 
Taiwan - - Yes Yes Yes 
Thailand* - - - - - 
Vietnam Yes - Yes Yes Yes 
 
3.3.2. Involuntary loss of citizenship 
 
Residence abroad 
Residence abroad constitutes a ground for loss in around half of the countries under 
discussion, with only Malaysia stipulating that it only applies to naturalised citizens. This is 
in clear contrast to Africa, for example, where most countries that provide for this ground for 
loss exclusively apply it to citizens by naturalisation or registration (Manby 2015: 175-176). 
 
Voluntary acquisition of other citizenship 
Since most countries in Asia reject dual citizenship, the voluntary acquisition of another 
citizenship leads to loss of one’s original citizenship in a majority of countries. Bangladesh 
and Pakistan provide that citizens who acquire a foreign citizenship may relinquish their 
original citizenship voluntarily. When citizenship is not relinquished voluntarily, it lapses 
automatically. Loss of citizenship upon acquiring another citizenship is still the main rule in 
South Korea, but the law provides for many exceptions (including when the person acquires 
the same citizenship as the spouse through marriage). In Sri Lanka this loss provision only 
applies to citizens by descent or registration. 
 
Service in foreign army/other services 
The laws of nine out of twenty-one countries provide for the loss of citizenship in case of 
service in a foreign army or by rendering other services to a foreign country - usually in the 
form of taking public office abroad without the consent of his/her country of nationality. 
 
Disloyalty or treason 
The table shows that this ground for loss can be found in around half of the countries. On a 
general note, it is observed that – like in Europe (Vonk, Vink, De Groot 2013: 81) – most 
national provisions are drafted in rather general terms, and the country reports do not discuss 
the practical interpretation of these often vaguely worded norms. In contrast to Europe, 
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however, no Asian country has recently amended its law to include terrorist activities under 
the umbrella of disloyalty or treason. 
The concept of loyalty goes particularly far in Malaysia: ‘Loyalty is the cornerstone 
of Malaysian citizenship, which means that renouncing Malaysian citizenship demonstrated 
an act of disloyalty to the country. There is no constitutional provision for former Malaysian 
citizens to recover their citizenship. The stipulated timeframe is longer than the ordinary 
naturalisation requirement of ten years provided under the constitution’ (Low 2017: 30). 
 
Other offences 
It is noteworthy that in most countries this ground for loss only applies to naturalised citizens. 
Thailand applies the provision to both naturalised citizens and citizens who were born in 
Thailand to a parent who was a foreigner. 
 
Fraud in acquisition 
There is widespread acceptance among the international instruments dealing with nationality 
law that fraud is a legitimate ground for loss of citizenship, even if this would render a person 
stateless (Vonk, Vink and De Groot 2013: 84). Even if countries do not explicitly provide for 
such a ground in their citizenship law, it may be assumed that citizenship may still be 
withdrawn based on principles of general administrative law. Laos and Vietnam are examples 
of good practice by providing that citizenship can only be lost within a period of 10 years 
after acquiring citizenship. 
 
Table 8 – Involuntary loss of citizenship - grounds of loss  
*naturalised citizens only 
 Residence 
abroad 
 
Voluntary 
acquisition of 
other 
citizenship 
Service in 
foreign 
army/ other 
services 
Disloyalty 
or treason 
Other 
offences 
Fraud in 
acquisition 
Afghanistan  No No Yes Yes No No 
Bangladesh Yes Yes No Yes* Yes* Yes 
Cambodia No No No No No No 
China No Yes No No No No 
East Timor No No Yes Yes* No Yes 
India Yes* Yes Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes 
Indonesia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Japan No Yes Yes No No No 
Laos Yes Yes No Yes* No Yes 
Malaysia Yes* Yes Yes* Yes Yes* Yes 
Mongolia No Yes No No No Yes 
Myanmar Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes* Yes 
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Nepal No Yes No No No Yes 
North 
Korea 
No No No No No No 
Pakistan Yes Yes No Yes* Yes* Yes 
Philippines Yes Yes* Yes Yes No Yes 
Singapore Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes* Yes 
South 
Korea 
No Yes No Yes* No Yes 
Sri Lanka No Yes No No No No 
Taiwan No No No No No No 
Thailand Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Vietnam No No No Yes No Yes 
 
 
4. Bookends of the citizenship spectrum: multiple nationality and 
statelessness 
 
While the GLOBALCIT typology on modes of acquisition covers facilitated naturalisation 
for refugees and stateless persons, there was no point in describing the situation in Asia in a 
separate table. Not a single country offers facilitated naturalisation to refugees and only three 
countries have provisions for stateless persons, although their practical impact seems 
minimal. Afghanistan provides for discretionary naturalisation of stateless persons upon 
fulfilling all the ordinary naturalisation requirements or upon marrying a citizen. China also 
grants discretionary naturalisation to stateless persons upon fulfilling all the ordinary 
naturalisation requirements. Only Vietnam offers naturalisation by entitlement to stateless 
persons who lack identification papers, have been settled in Vietnam for 20 years and respect 
the Constitution and laws of Vietnam. 
The lack of provisions dealing with facilitated naturalisation for refugees and stateless 
persons in Asia is not surprising given the particularly bad record in ratifying a number of 
relevant international treaties: 
x 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (145 parties): Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, China, East Timor, Japan, Philippines and South Korea; 
x 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (89 parties): Philippines 
and South Korea; 
x 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (68 parties): no Asian states. 
‘Although the ROK is a state party to the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless 
Persons’, the Korean report notes, ‘few legislative efforts have been made to bring the 
convention rules and standards into law and practice. Neither does the government seriously 
consider accession to the [1961] Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness’ (Lee 2017: 
41). 
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The case of Bangladesh shows that any protection offered to refugees is done on an ad hoc 
basis, not on the basis of an international obligation: 
Bangladesh has not acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and does not have any 
legislative provisions that allow those who are often called ‘illegal’ (irregular) or 
‘undocumented’ immigrants to seek asylum or the permanent residency status on 
humanitarian grounds. As the government often claims, it accepted ‘Myanmar 
refugees’ not out of any obligation, but rather acting under its prerogative and on a 
humanitarian ground. As such, the Rohingya refugees or the self-settled Rohingyas do 
not currently have a chance to get ‘earned citizenship’ by virtue of the government’s 
amnesty or regularisation. Nor do their children born in Bangladeshi camps have a 
right to be naturalised on the basis of residence/domicile in Bangladesh for a certain 
period (Hoque 2016: 12). 
The Philippines, by contrast, has been applauded for recently issuing a circular entitled 
‘Establishing the Refugee and Stateless Status Determination Procedure’.32 Its practical effect 
in securing Philippine nationality for those who have been recognised as stateless remains to 
be seen, however (Aguilar 2017: 21-22). Along similar lines, Vietnam has been discussed 
positively for providing protection against statelessness, at least on paper: 
Based on the letter of the law, Vietnam’s legislation appears to have stronger 
protections against statelessness, including clearer and more detailed provisions on 
the application and decision-making processes, than some of its neighbouring 
countries, such as Cambodia, where the domestic citizenship law offers no protection 
or prevention against statelessness, and leaves open a wide scope of discretion for 
government decision-makers, creating a higher risk of inconsistent application of its 
citizenship law provisions for ethnic minority groups residing in Cambodia, such as 
the ethnic Vietnamese, or other unpopular minority groups (Nguyen 2017: 4, 9). 
To end statelessness within 10 years, a goal set by UNHCR under its Global Action Plan 
2014-2024,33 the Southeast Asian region should be a clear priority.34 Not only because an 
estimated 40 per cent of the world’s stateless population is located there, but also –in 
Oakeshott’s view – in light of  
the situation of the community that self-identifies as Rohingya in Myanmar and the 
emphasis that the international community has placed over decades on the need to 
improve respect for their human rights and resolve their nationality status. The 
importance of finding solutions for this situation was highlighted by the regional and 
global focus on the ‘maritime crisis’ in the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal in 
May and June 2015, including the recognition by States in Southeast Asia of the need 
to address the root causes of the displacement (Oakeshott 2016: 347). 
While progress is being made to remedy statelessness in Southeast Asia (ibid: 373), no 
countries in the region have acceded to the 1954 or 1961 Conventions – with the exception of 
the Philippines which ratified the 1954 Convention. This has an effect on the large Rohingya 
diapora living throughout Southeast Asia, considering that an estimated 1.33 million 
                                                 
32 The lack of statelessness determination procedures among states that have ratified the 1954 and 1961 
Conventions is one of the main obstacles to giving practical effect to fulfilling their obligations under 
international law. See http://www.statelessness.eu/resources/ens-good-practice-guide-statelessness-
determination-and-protection-status-stateless.  
33 http://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/global-action-plan-2014-2024/.  
34 To be understood here as the ASEAN Member States, namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. See also 
https://www.statelessnessnetworkasiapacific.org.  
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Rohingya live in Myanmar while another 1.5 million live outside Myanmar.35 The situation 
in Myanmar is complex and controversial. As pointed out in the country report, 
[w]hile the [current] 1982 law sought to create a temporary class of less empowered 
citizens, not necessarily stateless persons, an uneven application of the law has had 
statelessness as a consequence. Hence, arguably a rule of law abiding application of 
the law would have significantly reduced the number of persons with an unclear 
citizenship status. For example, often persons holding National Registration Cards (de 
facto proof of citizenship) but not belonging to [one of the 135] recognised [ethnic] 
groups were not given access to full citizenship even though they were arguably 
entitled to it. Moreover, the Muslim communities in Rakhine generally refused to 
participate in a process which denied their right to identify themselves as they wished 
and named them as ‘Bengali’ (in practice, foreigners) in line with the official 
narrative originated during [General] Ne Win’s regime [1962-1988] (Arraiza and 
Vonk 2017: 13). 
The accession of the Southeast Asian states to, in particular, the 1961 Convention would 
gradually eradicate statelessness in the region, given the protection offered in Articles 1-4 to 
children who would be otherwise stateless (Vonk et al. 2016). 
Turning to dual citizenship, it is hard to draw clear conclusions with regard to Asian 
policies. It follows from the reports that only few countries wholeheartedly accept dual 
citizenship, such as Cambodia (Sperfeldt 2017: 14) and East Timor (Jerónimo 2017: 35), and 
that a great majority are still against, including China (Low 2016: 11), India (Ashesh and 
Thiruvengadam 2017: 15-16; but note that India has introduced the concept of ‘overseas 
citizenship’36 in recent years), Indonesia (Harijanti 2017: 2), Japan (Kondo 2016: 13), 
Malaysia and Singapore (Low 2017: 7, 27), South Korea (Lee 2017: 31-32), and Vietnam 
(Nguyen 2017: 17). 
Some of these countries are formally against, but provide for exceptions (Lee 2017: 8, 
31-32, 38-40); permit dual citizenship under limited circumstances (Hoque 2016: 19); do not 
strictly enforce their anti-dual citizenship policies in respect of children born from mixed 
marriages (Kondo 2016: 6); or differentiate between birthright citizens and naturalised 
citizens (Taiwan allows dual citizenship for the former but not for the latter, see Low 2016: 2, 
20).  
The Philippines is ambiguous. While Aguilar notes that ‘in 2003 the Philippines 
joined the ranks of states worldwide that grant dual citizenship’, this is immediately nuanced 
by explaining that ‘this privilege is restricted to natural-born citizens who undergo 
naturalisation in another country. The law entitles them to retain or reacquire Philippine 
citizenship through an administrative process that includes the taking of a nonexclusive oath 
of allegiance to the Philippines. They then reacquire their natural-born status’ (Aguilar 2017: 
2). 
 
                                                 
35 Zawacki 2013: 20; Van Waas 2017: 50; Van Waas 2015: 29. For the situation of the Rohingya in Bangladesh, 
see Hoque 2016: 11-12. 
36 Ashesh and Thiruvengadam (19) call ‘overseas citizenship’ an ‘active pursuit of policies aimed at the eventual 
goal of dual citizenship for people of Indian origin (or the Indian diaspora). Though aimed at the overall 
diaspora, these policies seem aimed at benefiting groups located in particular regions of the world, including 
North America and the United Kingdom, which are more affluent and better placed to aid political parties and 
policies of foreign investment’.  
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5. Discrepancies between law and practice 
 
In studying the Asian nationality laws, one often finds contradictions. This is also 
acknowledged in the country reports. Thus, the legal instruments in Bangladesh have been 
said to be mutually conflictive (Hoque 2016: 4); the citizenship law and Constitution of Sri 
Lanka had been inconsistent for decades until this was remedied by a 2003 amendment 
(Ganeshathasan and Welikala 2017: 13); and East Timor has a normative framework which 
‘is not always consistent’ and the ordinary legislation is ‘full of terminological and regulatory 
inconsistencies and is often at odds with the constitutional norm’ (Jerónimo 2017: 20, 41). 
The above should be read in conjunction with the discrepancy that exists in many 
Asian countries between law and practice – a situation that Asia shares with Africa. The 
following description of the situation in Cambodia may serve as an illustration: 
[One] need[s] to look beyond the relatively well-developed legal framework in 
Cambodia and consider the often-different reality of implementation and practice. 
Laws on citizenship and other relevant regulations have rarely been implemented as 
written. Thus, the [country report’s] account of the current citizenship regime is 
complicated by a lack of certainty over the degree of respect for, and enforcement of 
relevant laws and policies. Many laws and regulations are not easily available in 
public. The same is true for written judgments or citizenship-related statistics. Against 
this background, it is important to note that this report is limited to the available 
information, and it does not purport to be comprehensive or portray in an accurate 
manner the current practical operation of Cambodia’s citizenship regime (Sperfeldt 
2017: 11). 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Asia is most likely the continent where nationality is most jealously guarded, which can be 
explained by the fact that a majority of countries only gained independence from colonial 
rule in the twentieth century or subsequently seceded from a territory that was created after 
such independence (e.g. Bangladesh and Pakistan in relation to India, and Singapore in 
relation to Malaysia). Continent-wide initiatives such as the 2014 Brazil Declaration, in 
which ‘UNHCR and representatives of 28 countries and three territories in Latin American 
and the Caribbean adopted a road map to […] end statelessness by 2024’,37 or the ‘Resolution 
on the Right to Nationality’38 adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights in 2013 are conspicuously absent in the region.39 Asian countries also have 
particularly low accession rates to international treaties dealing with nationality, such as the 
                                                 
37http://www.unhcr.org/brazil-declaration.html and http://www.fmreview.org/latinamerica-
caribbean/mondelli.html.  
38 http://www.achpr.org/sessions/53rd/resolutions/234/.   
39 An exception is the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights, which provides in Article 18 that ‘Every person 
has the right to a nationality as prescribed by law. No person shall be arbitrarily deprived of such nationality nor 
denied the right to change that nationality’ (emphasis added). The reference to national legislation makes this a 
rather weak provision. See http://www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/6_AHRD_Booklet.pdf.  
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1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness.40 
While relatively few legal standards for protection against statelessness exist, the 
Asian countries are also hesitant to accept dual nationality. Only a handful of countries 
embrace the phenomenon, whereas a majority does not but allows multiple nationality under 
limited circumstances or choses not to stringently enforce its anti-dual nationality policies. 
The primary mode of acquiring citizenship by birth in Asia is by ius sanguinis, with 
most countries imposing more stringent requirements if the child is born abroad. In line with 
international developments, gender equality has been introduced from the 1980s onwards. 
Asia has also followed the global trend of either abolishing automatic ius soli or replacing it 
by more conditional forms of ius soli. Particularly noteworthy when compared to Europe, but 
not to Africa or the Americas, is the modest role of ordinary naturalisation as a means to 
acquire nationality. Indeed, naturalisation rates are very low and individuals that do naturalise 
usually have a family connection to a national.  
While this report has drawn not only on an analysis of the legal provisions pertaining 
to nationality law but also on their interpretation and implementation as explained in 
numerous country reports, we may conclude this overview by subscribing to Acosta’s plea 
for more ‘global’ research so as to ‘nuance generalisations that have usually been 
extrapolated from the analysis of only a handful of cases in Europe and North America’ and 
to gain a better insight into worldwide patterns and trends.41 More research is particularly 
needed on the grounds for loss of citizenship in Asia. While comparative projects such as 
ILEC have done much to map the grounds for loss of citizenship and their implementation in 
Europe,42 similar studies in Asia would surely contribute to contextualising and measuring 
the impact of the isolated cases discussed in the country reports. 
                                                 
40 UNHCR provides an overview in the following colour map:  http://www.refworld.org/docid/54576a754.html.  
41 Acosta 2016: 19. 
42 For information on ILEC (Involuntary Loss of European Citizenship), see http://www.ilecproject.eu.  
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